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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 5, 2000, a young African-American businessman named
Jacob King was waiting to catch a plane at Eppley Airfield in Omaha,
Nebraska.1 King was planning on flying from Omaha to Phoenix to
purchase a car for his car cleaning and detailing business. He had
decided to purchase the car with cash so that he would not have to
wait for a check to clear from an out-of-state bank. When King went
to the Southwest Airlines desk at Eppley Airfield, he paid cash for his
ticket. He was then immediately questioned by a sheriffs deputy who
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Jason R. Humke, B.A. 2002, University of Northern Iowa; J.D. 2005, University
of Nebraska College of Law.
1. The following story was taken from ACLU of Nebraska Wins "Flying While Black"
Case, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, May 2, 2001, at http://www.aclu.org/Ra-
cialEquality/RacialEquality.cfm?ID=7244&c=133.
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worked at the airport. The deputy asked whether King had a large
amount of cash with him. When King told him that he was carrying
approximately $7,000, the deputy took King's money into another
room and had it sniffed by a drug dog. When the deputy returned, he
told King that the drug dog had detected the odor of narcotics on the
money.2 The deputy then told King that his money was being seized
on the suspicion that it had been utilized in drug trafficking. His
money was seized through a process known as civil forfeiture, where
property is "condemned" and then taken by the State. King, however,
was not arrested by the deputy and he was never charged with a
crime.
King went to the Nebraska branch of the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") to seek legal assistance in getting his money returned
to him. The ACLU chose to take the case primarily to challenge the
use of racial profiling by police in airports to infer that black men with
large amounts of money are drug couriers.
When the ACLU challenged the forfeiture, King learned that his
money, which had been confiscated by a local sheriff, had been turned
over to the federal government through a process known as "federal
adoption." King and the ACLU had to challenge the forfeiture pro-
ceeding in federal court and meet the procedural requirements and
burden of proof imposed upon claimants under the federal asset-forfei-
ture statutes. This placed King at a significant disadvantage, because
the federal forfeiture proceedings lacked many of the procedural safe-
guards that were required in forfeiture proceedings brought under Ne-
2. The drug dog likely was set off simply because King was carrying a rather large
amount of currency. This is because a high percentage of the currency in circula-
tion has been contaminated by drug residue. For this reason, several Courts of
Appeal have criticized the use of drug dog detections as the means of establishing
probable cause that currency was utilized in drug transactions. See, e.g., United
States v. $242,484.00 in United States Currency, 351 F.3d 499, 511 (11th Cir.
2003) (noting that a drug dog's sniff of currency is "of little value" in determining
whether the currency is used for narcotics trafficking because as much as eighty
percent of all currency in circulation contains drug residue); United States v.
$506,231 in United States Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 453 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing
to take seriously the results of a dog alert because a minimum of one-third-or as
much as ninety-six percent-of currency in the United States is contaminated
with drug residue) (citing cases and authorities); Muhammed v. DEA, 92 F.3d
648, 653 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a dog alert is "virtually meaningless"
because "an extremely high percentage of all cash in circulation in America today
is contaminated with drug-residue"); United States v. $5,000 in U.S. Currency, 40
F.3d 846, 849-50 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the value of a dog alert is 'mini-
mal," because seventy to ninety-seven percent of currency in the United States is
0so thoroughly corrupted" with cocaine contamination) (citing cases and authori-
ties). See also Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 839 (2005) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (surveying judicial opinions that belie drug dogs' supposed infallibility and
arguing that drug dogs often perform with "less than perfect accuracy").
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braska law. In fact, under Nebraska's forfeiture statute,3 there likely
would have been insufficient evidence even to bring a forfeiture action
against King's money.4 Unfortunately, Nebraska's forfeiture statute,
for all intents and purposes, no longer existed. Since the Nebraska
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Franco,5 drug-related civil forfeit-
ures in this state have been brought almost exclusively under federal
law. As Jacob King's story demonstrates, the Franco decision has had
a profound impact on how civil forfeitures are pursued in Nebraska.
In Parts II and III, this Note will examine the reasoning behind
the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in State v. Franco, as well as
the decision's effect on how forfeitures are now conducted within this
state. Section III.B of this Note will then examine how the Franco
decision intensified the practice of federal adoption and how that prac-
tice has allowed state law enforcement to circumvent Nebraska law.
Finally, section III.C of this Note will propose an alternative to the
current system that attempts to balance the concerns of civil libertari-
ans with those of law enforcement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Civil Forfeiture in the United States
In the United States, there are essentially two types of asset forfei-
ture proceedings that are utilized by the federal government: criminal
forfeitures and civil forfeitures. 6 Criminal forfeitures, as the name
suggests, are punitive sanctions brought against a defendant as part
of a criminal proceeding. 7 Since these forfeitures are considered puni-
tive, the Constitution requires the conviction of the defendant and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's assets are sub-
ject to forfeiture.8
Civil forfeitures, in contrast, have minimal constitutional protec-
tions. These proceedings are brought in rem (against the property it-
self) under the legal fiction that the property itself committed a
3. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-431 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
4. This is because, under Nebraska law, the State is required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that confiscated monies were used to facilitate drug trafficking.
See id. § 28-431(4); infra section III.B.
5. 257 Neb. 15, 594 N.W.2d 633 (1999).
6. Evan Williford, The Basics of Forfeiture: Testing the Limits of Constitutionality,
14 CRIM. JUST. 26, 27-28 (2000). There is also a third type of proceeding entitled
"administrative forfeiture," in which a law enforcement agency uses nonjudicial
proceedings to confiscate unclaimed property. However, these proceedings are
typically categorized as a type of civil forfeiture, since a civil proceeding may be
brought if a claimant comes forward to contest the forfeiture. See Anthony G.
Hall, Q & A on Recovering the Proceeds of Crime/Forfeiting the Instrumentalities
of Crime, 42 ADvoc. 16 (1999).
7. See Williford, supra note 6.
8. Id.
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crime. 9 Since the proceedings are brought in rem, there appears to be
no constitutionally mandated burden of proof, and property owners do
not even have to be charged with a crime.1 0 The constitutionality of
these proceedings is justified on the basis that the proceedings serve a
remedial rather than a punitive purpose."1
The historical origin and evolution of civil forfeiture law in the
United States has been thoroughly documented by numerous legal
commentators, and duplicating their efforts would go beyond the scope
of this Note.12 However, a brief history of the origins of civil forfeiture
would assist the reader in understanding this area of the law.
Historically, civil forfeiture proceedings were utilized in the United
States as a means of enforcing the nation's custom laws. 13 The pri-
mary purpose of these early forfeiture statutes was to recover the rev-
enue that was lost as a result of the rampant attempts to circumvent
the federal custom laws during this period. 14 The use of in rem pro-
ceedings was necessary in early forfeiture cases predominantly as a
means of establishing jurisdiction over property in situations where
9. Brant C. Hadaway, Comment, Executive Privateers: A Discussion on Why the
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform the Practice of
Forfeiture, 55 U. MiAii L. REV. 81, 97-98 (2000).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. For a more extensive historical analysis of the development of civil forfeiture law
in the United States, see Stefan D. Cassella, The Uniform Innocent Owner De-
fense to Civil Asset Forfeiture: The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 Cre-
ates a Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Most Civil Forfeiture Cases Filed by the
Federal Government, 89 Ky. L.J. 653, 656-58 (2000-2001); Barclay Thomas John-
son, Restoring Civility-The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Bay Steps
Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1047-48
(2002); David Pimentel, Forfeiture Procedure in Federal Court: An Overview, 183
F.R.D. 1, 3-5 (1999); Joel A. Beck, Comment, The Per Se Rule of Civil Forfeiture
of Money Found in "Close Proximity" to Controlled Substances, 37 IDAHo L. REV.
641, 644-47 (2001); Eric N. Bergquist, Note, Statutory In Rem Civil Forfeiture,
The Punishment of Innocent Owners and the Excessive Fines Clause: An Analysis
of Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996), 76 NEB. L. REV. 155, 156-62 (1997);
Hadaway, supra note 9, at 88-92; Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth:
How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45
U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 916-18 (1991); David Benjamin Ross, Comment, Civil For-
feiture: A Fiction That Offends Due Process, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 259, 260-64
(2000-2001); Alison Roberts Solomon, Comment, Drugs and Money: How Suc-
cessful is the Seizure and Forfeiture Program at Raising Revenue and Distribut-
ing Proceeds?, 42 EMORY L.J. 1149, 1151-52 (1993).
13. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682-84 (1974).
14. Hadaway, supra note 9, at 89. See also C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133,
137 (1943) (reasoning that the authority to commence proceedings in rem against
vessels engaging in illegal conduct on navigable waters was inherited by the
United States from the English law of Exchequer, which used forfeiture as a
means of enforcing revenue collection).
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the property owners were outside of the country.15 However, the Su-
preme Court also made clear in these early cases that, for in rem pro-
ceedings, property could be confiscated without regard to the owner's
participation in or knowledge of the illegal act that the property had
been used to commit.16
During the 1920s Prohibition era, the use of civil forfeiture was
expanded beyond the context of admiralty law to target the "instru-
mentalities" used to manufacture and distribute illegal liquor.17 The
Supreme Court applied its earlier forfeiture decisions in the admiralty
context to the National Prohibition Actls and concluded that, based
upon the nature of in rem proceedings, property owners could be
forced to forfeit their property, even if they did not know their prop-
erty was being used for illegal purposes. 19
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the focus of asset forfeit-
ures shifted dramatically with the start of the war on drugs. 20 Today,
the most widely used federal forfeiture statutes come from the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, enacted by Con-
gress in 1970.21 A series of amendments to the drug-related forfeiture
statutes created under this Act steadily increased the types of assets
that were subject to forfeiture for drug-related offenses. 22 These sub-
sequent amendments also gave the Department of Justice exclusive
control over proceeds received from asset forfeitures, instead of plac-
ing the proceeds in the U.S. Treasury as previously had been re-
quired. 23 Through these subsequent amendments to the federal
forfeiture statutes, the power of federal law enforcement to seize drug-
15. See Melissa A. Rolland, Comment, Forfeiture Law, the Eighth Amendment's Ex-
cessive Fines Clause, and United States v. Bajakajian, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1371, 1373-75 (1999).
16. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
17. Cossella, supra note 12, at 656-57. See also Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465
(1926) (holding that the line of cases upholding civil forfeitures to enforce admi-
ralty laws is applicable to forfeitures of the instrumentalities of bootlegging).
18. Pub. L. No. 66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1933) (stating that conveyances of
intoxicating liquors were subject to forfeiture).
19. See, e.g., Waterloo Distilling Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931).
20. See Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging 'Drug Exception' to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 892-94 (1987).
21. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-886 (2000)).
22. See Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-633, tit. 3, § 301(a), 92 Stat.
3768, 3777 (1978) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (2000)) (expanding the range
of forfeitable property to "moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other
things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange
for a controlled substance"); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L.
98-473, tit. 2, § 306(a), 98 Stat. 2050, 2051, 2075 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(2000)) (expanding the range of property subject to forfeiture to include real
property).
23. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, tit. 2, § 310, 98
Stat. 2050, 2051, 2075 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (2000)).
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related assets and use those assets for their own purposes was greatly
expanded. However, as is explained in section III.B infra, the amend-
ment to the federal forfeiture statutes that would prove to have the
greatest impact on civil forfeiture in the State of Nebraska was the
1984 provision that created the procedure known as "federal
adoption."24
B. Civil Forfeiture in Nebraska Prior to State v. Franco
At the same time Congress was amending the federal forfeiture
statutes in an effort to wage the war on drugs, Nebraska was taking
action to reform its own civil forfeiture statute. In November 1984,
Nebraska amended its constitution through a voter initiative to allow
fifty percent of the funds received through drug-related forfeitures to
be paid over to the "county drug law enforcement fund" for the county
where the seizure was made.2 5 Each county was required under this
constitutional amendment to set up its own county drug law enforce-
ment board to oversee the use of forfeiture proceeds for drug enforce-
ment purposes. 2 6 The amendment required that the other fifty
percent of assets seized from drug-related forfeitures be appropriated
exclusively to the use and support of the common schools.27 The clear
purpose of this amendment was to allow state law enforcement to ben-
efit from a portion of the assets seized from their counter-drug opera-
tions without giving the confiscating agency direct and total control
over the use of these assets, as the federal statute allowed.28 The
amendment also reflected the intent of Nebraska citizens to allow the
state's schools to share in the revenue from drug-related forfeitures. 2 9
The following year, the Nebraska Legislature amended Nebraska's
drug-related forfeiture statute, section 28-431 of the Nebraska Re-
vised Statutes,30 to enact the statutory changes called for in the con-
stitutional amendment. The statute was also amended to bring it into
conformity with the federal drug-related forfeiture statute by allowing
law enforcement to confiscate large quantities of money believed to be
connected to drug trafficking.3 1 During the Judiciary Committee
24. See infra section III.B.
25. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
26. Id. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439.03 (Reissue 1995) (detailing the require-
ments of the county drug law enforcement boards).
27. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
28. Hearing on L.B. 77 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. 12-14
(Neb. 1983) [hereinafter Hearing on L.B. 77] (statement of Senator Carol Mc-
Bride-Pirsch, co-sponsor of LB 77).
29. Hearing on L.R. 2CA Before the Comm. on Constitutional Revision, 88th Leg., 1st
Sess. 3-4 (Neb. 1983) (statement of Senator Carol McBride-Pirsch, sponsor of LR
2CA).
30. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-431 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
31. Hearing on L.B. 77, supra note 28, at 13.
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hearings on this legislation, the Committee emphasized the intent for
section 28-431 to emulate the federal statute as much as possible.
3 2
However, the legislature chose to diverge from the federal statute on
several key issues. For instance, section 28-431 does not allow forfeit-
ures of real property, such as farms or homes. 33 Section 28-431 also
requires a higher burden of proof than the federal statute to establish
that confiscated property was involved in illegal drug trafficking.3 4 As
the legislative record of these amendments indicates, section 28-431's
divergence from the federal forfeiture statute was largely based upon
the policy judgments of the legislature and not based upon any intent
to change the remedial purpose of the statute.35 However, in State v.
Franco,36 the Nebraska Supreme Court used these discrepancies be-
tween the two statutes to conclude that the Nebraska Legislature in-
tended forfeitures under section 28-431 to be criminal proceedings. As
this Note will demonstrate, the Court's ruling effectively nullified Ne-
braska's forfeiture law.
C. State v. Franco
On December 21, 1997, Juan Franco Jr. was arrested by the Ne-
braska State Patrol for transporting a large amount of cocaine in his
1992 Chevrolet pickup.37 On December 26, 1997, the Lancaster
County Attorney's office filed a forfeiture action under section 28-431
against the pickup and the $2,190 that was found within it. The for-
feiture action alleged that all of these items were used to facilitate
drug trafficking in violation of Nebraska law, 38 and therefore, the
property was properly subject to forfeiture.
On February 9, 1998, the Lancaster County Attorney's Office filed
an information charging Juan Franco with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. 39 The forfeiture proceeding was com-
menced against Franco on February 17, 1998 but was not concluded
that day. The next day, Juan Franco's lawyers filed a plea in bar,
32. Id.
33. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-431.
34. Compare id. § 28-431(4) (requiring the State to prove case beyond a reasonable
doubt), with 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2000) (requiring the government to prove case by a
preponderance of the evidence).
35. Hearing on L.B. 247 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Leg., 1st Sess.
97-100 (Neb. 1985) [hereinafter Hearing on L.B. 2471 (statement of Senator Carol
McBride-Pirsch, co-sponsor of LB 247) (describing the intended purpose of the
legislation amending section 28-431).
36. 257 Neb. 15, 594 N.W.2d 633 (1999).
37. Id. at 17, 594 N.W.2d at 636.
38. Specifically, against NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-416 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
39. Franco, 257 Neb. at 17, 594 N.W.2d at 636.
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requesting that the criminal charges against Franco be dismissed for
violating both the state and federal Double Jeopardy Clauses.
40
State v. Franco41 reached the Nebraska Supreme Court in 1999,
four years after the United States Supreme Court decided United
States v. Ursery.4 2 In Ursery, the Supreme Court had held that for-
feitures pursuant to the federal civil forfeiture statute were not pun-
ishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 43 The Ursery
Court utilized a two-prong test to determine whether either the pur-
pose or the effect of the federal forfeiture statute was such that the
statute should be considered punitive for purposes of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. Under the first prong of this test, the reviewing court
must consider whether the legislature "intended the particular forfei-
ture to be a remedial civil sanction or a criminal penalty."4 4 Under
the second prong of the test, the court must determine "whether the
forfeiture proceedings are so punitive in fact as to establish that they
may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature, despite any congres-
sional intent to establish a civil remedial mechanism."45
During its analysis of Nebraska's section 28-431, the Franco court
purported to follow the same two-prong test that was utilized in Ur-
sery.4 6 The Franco court started its analysis of section 28-431 under
the first prong by noting that Nebraska's Double Jeopardy Clause had
been interpreted as providing coextensive protection with the federal
Eighth Amendment.47 Therefore, the court determined that it should
compare the Nebraska forfeiture statute to the federal forfeiture stat-
ute assessed in Ursery.4
8
After comparing the two forfeiture statutes, the Franco court found
three reasons to distinguish Ursery and concluded that the Nebraska
Legislature intended section 28-431 to create criminal forfeiture pro-
ceedings. First, the court compared the "label" affixed to the federal
and Nebraska statutes. The court noted that the federal forfeiture
statute was entitled "civil forfeiture," while section 28-431 was codi-
fied under Chapter 28 of the Nebraska Code, which was entitled
"Crimes and Punishments." 49
The Franco court also distinguished section 28-431 by relying on
previous Nebraska cases that stated, in dicta, that forfeitures pursu-
40. See id. at 18, 594 N.W.2d at 636.
41. 257 Neb. 15, 594 N.W.2d 633.
42. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
43. Id. at 292.
44. Id. at 268.
45. Id.
46. Franco, 257 Neb. at 19-20, 594 N.W.2d at 637-38.
47. Id. at 20, 594 N.W.2d at 638.
48. See Franco, 257 Neb. at 20-23, 594 N.W.2d at 638-40.
49. Id. at 21-22, 594 N.W.2d at 638.
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ant to section 28-431 were "criminal in nature.5o The court reasoned
that the legislature had acquiesced to this interpretation of section 28-
431 in these prior cases by failing to amend the statute to clearly
demonstrate a contrary intent.5 1
Finally, the Franco court distinguished section 28-431 from the
federal forfeiture statute by relying upon the different standard of
proof required by the two statutes. The court concluded that, because
section 28-431 required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that property was subject to forfeiture, the legislature must have in-
tended to create a criminal forfeiture statute.52
After determining that the legislature intended section 28-431 to
create criminal forfeiture proceedings, the Franco court quickly con-
cluded the Double Jeopardy Clause applied to the statute.5 3 Applying
the Blockburger54 Test to the statute, the court held that forfeiture
proceedings brought under section 28-431 and criminal narcotics pro-
ceedings brought under section 28-41655 constituted the same offense
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.56 Since the court deter-
mined that Juan Franco Jr. was placed in jeopardy when the forfei-
ture proceeding was commenced against him, the Double Jeopardy
Clause required that the subsequent criminal proceedings for narcot-
ics possession had to be dismissed. 57
III. ANALYSIS
A. Breaking Down Franco's Holding
The Nebraska Supreme Court purported to apply the two-prong
test announced in Ursery when it concluded that the legislature in-
tended section 28-431 to be a criminal forfeiture statute; however, the
court's application of this test was flawed for multiple reasons. First,
the Franco court overemphasized the differences between the federal
forfeiture statute and section 28-431 to support its conclusion that the
legislature intended section 28-431 to be a criminal sanction. For in-
50. Id. at 23-24, 594 N.W.2d at 638-640.
51. Id. at 23, 594 N.W.2d at 639.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 24, 594 N.W.2d at 640.
54. The "Blockburger Test" or "Same Elements Test" refers to the Constitutional
principle announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), where
the Court said that two criminal punishments will be considered the same offense
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause if either offense can be proven by
establishing all the elements of the other offense. Therefore, if two criminal stat-
utes have the same elements, they are considered cumulative punishments that
are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause unless they are brought within the
same criminal proceeding. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983).
55. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-416 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
56. Franco, 257 Neb. at 25-28, 594 N.W.2d at 640-42.
57. Id. at 28, 594 N.W.2d at 642.
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stance, the court distinguished the federal and state forfeiture stat-
utes by noting that section 28-431 was codified under the Nebraska
Criminal Code, but the court erroneously relied upon this distinction
as evidence of the legislature's intent. Under Nebraska law, the Ne-
braska Revisor of Statutes-not the legislature-is responsible for de-
termining how legislative enactments are codified within the statute
books.58 Therefore, the location where a statute is codified does not
indicate whether the legislature intended the statute to be civil or
criminal. In earlier cases, the Nebraska Supreme Court appeared to
recognize this fact by determining that other forfeiture statutes con-
tained within Nebraska's criminal code were civil in nature.
5 9
The Franco court's reliance on where section 28-431 was codified
also demonstrates that the Franco court ignored the U.S. Supreme
Court's guidance on how to apply the first prong of the test utilized in
Ursery. In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,60 an ear-
lier forfeiture case where the Supreme Court applied this two-prong
test, the Court specifically rejected the "label argument" relied upon
by the Franco court.6 1 In fact, in 89 Firearms, the Supreme Court
determined that a forfeiture provision was civil, even though the au-
thorizing statute was contained within a criminal law.
62
The U.S. Supreme Court also indicated that ascertaining legisla-
tive intent required an examination of "'the procedural mechanisms
[the legislature] established for enforcing forfeitures under the stat-
ute,'" rather than merely examining the title that was given to the
statute.6 3 The Ursery Court itself only mentioned the title of the fed-
eral forfeiture statute it was examining in passing as it listed the vari-
ous procedural mechanisms within the statute that indicated the
legislature's intent to create a civil forfeiture proceeding.
6 4
In contrast, the Franco court largely appeared to ignore the proce-
dural mechanisms within section 28-431 that indicated it was a civil
forfeiture statute. For instance, section 28-431 (like the federal stat-
58. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 49-702, -705, -805 (Reissue 2004). This argument was
first raised in the State of Nebraska's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court following the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in
Franco. See Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the Nebraska Supreme Court at 8,
Franco, 1999 WL 33640379 (Sept. 21, 1999) (No. 99-497) (available in the Schmid
Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of Law).
59. See State v. Two IGT Video Poker Games, 237 Neb. 145, 146, 465 N.W.2d 453,
456 (1991) (holding that a statute codified within the criminal code that author-
ized forfeitures of gambling items was civil in nature).
60. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
61. Id. at 364 n.6.
62. Id. at 363-66.
63. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996) (quoting United States. v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984)).
64. See id. at 288-89.
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ute) contains a provision that places the burden of proof squarely upon
the claimant to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she (a) has not used or intended
to use the property to facilitate an offense in violation of [the statute], (b) has
an interest in such property as owner or lienor or otherwise, acquired by him
or her in good faith, and (c) at no time had any knowledge that such property
was being or would be used in, or to facilitate, the violation [of the statute] .65
As section 28-431 indicates, if the claimant cannot meet this burden,
the property will not be returned, regardless of whether the State is
able to meet its own burden of proof.6 6 By placing separate burdens of
proof upon both the State and the claimant, the procedural mecha-
nisms of section 28-431 cannot fairly be viewed as consistent with a
criminal forfeiture statute.
Instead of reviewing section 28-431 in light of the burden of proof it
places upon both parties, the Franco court chose to focus exclusively
upon the State's own burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt as evidence that the legislature intended the statute to be crimi-
nal.6 7 Although such a high burden of proof is normally reserved for
criminal statutes, the Franco court was mistaken to rely upon this
requirement as conclusive evidence of the legislature's intent. Since
civil forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, 68 several
states have chosen to require a higher burden of proof than normally
is required in civil proceedings. 6 9 Other states besides Nebraska have
65. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-431(4) (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2004). This type of pro-
vision has been labeled an "innocent owner's defense" by legal commentators. See
Hadaway, supra note 9, at 107-08.
66. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-431(4). This rather awkward provision of the statute
was perplexing to the county attorneys who brought forfeiture proceedings prior
to the Franco decision. As the statute was interpreted by the lower courts, a
claimant has to meet the burden of proof in order to have the property returned,
but the State also has to meet its own burden of proof (beyond a reasonable
doubt) to succeed in the forfeiture proceeding. Id. If neither the claimant nor the
State was able to meet their respective burdens of proof, the property would con-
tinue to be held by the court for a period of time to ensure there were no other
claims to the property, and then the property would eventually be placed within
the State's general fund like all other unclaimed property. Interview with Pat-
rick Condon, Deputy Lancaster County Attorney, in Lincoln, Neb. (Oct. 28, 2004).
67. See State v. Franco, 257 Neb. 15, 23, 594 N.W.2d 633, 639 (1999).
68. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 697 (1965) (citing
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886)).
69. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,488.4(i)(1)-(2) (West 2004) (requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt for real property and personal property valued
at not less than $25,000 for civil forfeiture proceedings); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 1311(1)(b) (McKinney 2004) (requiring clear and convincing evidence in New
York civil forfeiture proceedings); Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588
So. 2d 957, 968 (Fla. 1991) (holding that Florida law required clear and convinc-
ing evidence in civil forfeiture proceedings); A 1983 Volkswagen v. County of
Washoe, 699 P.2d 108, 109 (Nev. 1985) (holding that, for civil forfeiture actions in
Nevada, "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is appropriate in order that the inno-
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placed the burden of proof at beyond a reasonable doubt,70 presuma-
bly in order to eliminate an incentive for the prosecution to choose
forfeiture proceedings over filing criminal charges.71 The Nebraska
Supreme Court itself has recognized that certain civil proceedings
that contain quasi-criminal sanctions, such as civil contempt hear-
ings, should require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.72 It is under-
standable, given the nature of civil forfeiture proceedings, that the
Nebraska Legislature would choose to heighten the State's burden of
proof as a matter of public policy rather than with the intent of creat-
ing an additional criminal sanction.
The legislative history surrounding the enactment and subsequent
amendment of section 28-431 provides additional evidence that the
legislature intended to create civil forfeiture proceedings. In 1980,
when section 28-431 was amended to include drug paraphernalia in
the class of property subject to forfeiture under the statute, Senator
Nichol stated: "ITIhe final committee amendment is a technical
amendment which plugs into the civil forfeiture sections of our ex-
cent not be permanently deprived of their property."). See also H.R. REP. No.
106-192, at 11-12 (1999) (advocating a "clear and convincing" evidence standard
for civil forfeiture proceedings), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong-reports&docid=f:hr192.106.pdf; John H. Hing-
son III, A Cry for Reform: Revamping the Government's Power to Seize, CONN. L.
TRIB., May 16, 1994, at 25, 30 (advocating for a higher standard of proof in forfei-
ture actions than is required under typical civil proceedings).
70. See, e.g., People v. $9,632.50 United States Currency, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125, 128
(1998) (discussing California's forfeiture statute, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11,488.4(i)(1) (West 2004), which entitles property claimants to a jury finding of
forfeitability beyond a reasonable doubt in certain cases).
71. See, e.g., Rick Fueyo, Normative Considerations of Asset Forfeiture Under the
Drug Abuse Control Act-Who Will Protect the People?-The Judiciary as Vox
Populi, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 186 (1994-1995) (arguing for a higher
burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings because these proceedings "pit the
power of the.., government against the individual"); Nkechi Taifa, Civil Forfei-
ture vs. Civil Liberties, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 95, 116 (1994) (reasoning that "[ilf
the property owner is truly involved in criminal activity to an extent that would
justify forfeiture of the property, the government should be able to prove the
criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt"); Robin M. Sackett, Comment,
The Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending Constitutional Protections to
Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495,
520-21 (1994) (arguing that a higher standard of proof in forfeiture proceedings
is necessary to remove the incentive for law enforcement to pursue forfeitures
instead of criminal convictions). But see George Fishman, Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform: The Agenda Before Congress, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 121, 130 (1994) (not-
ing that, if the beyond a reasonable doubt standard could be met by the State,
then it would be simpler for the State to just convict the claimant in a criminal
trial and seize his assets via a criminal forfeiture proceeding).
72. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2121 (Reissue 1995); Dunning v. Tallman, 244 Neb. 1,
6-7, 504 N.W.2d 85, 90 (1993); State ex rel. Kandt v. North Platte Baptist
Church, 225 Neb. 657, 407 N.W.2d 747 (1987); In re Contempt of Liles, 217 Neb.
414, 349 N.W.2d 377 (1984).
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isting law. These amendments will provide direction to the courts to
dispose of drug paraphernalia which has been civilly forfeited."
73
Prior versions of section 28-431 also reflect the legislature's intent
that it be a civil forfeiture statute. For instance, the 1977 version of
the statute stated: "The answer or demurrer shall allege the interest
or liability of the party filing it. In all other respects the issue shall be
made up as in other civil actions."
74
The most compelling evidence that section 28-431 was intended to
create civil forfeiture proceedings is that, if the statute is construed to
be a criminal forfeiture provision, criminal charges for narcotics pos-
session cannot possibly be brought concurrently with forfeiture pro-
ceedings. If the Nebraska Supreme Court was correct that the
legislature intended section 28-431 to create a criminal forfeiture pro-
ceeding, then it follows that the legislature would have anticipated
situations where a defendant was being tried for narcotics possession
while having his property forfeited (such as Juan Franco Jr.). Pre-
sumably, the legislature would have drafted the statute's procedural
requirements with these situations in mind. Instead, section 28-431
requires that forfeiture proceedings be brought within ten days of con-
fiscating the property. 75 This means that, for a narcotics possession
charge to be brought against a defendant at the same time, the county
attorneys would not only have to charge the defendant, but also be
completely ready for trial within ten days. As a practical matter, such
a procedure would be untenable, 76 especially in larger narcotics cases
where it would take county attorneys significant time to prepare for
trial. Other criminal procedural statutes demonstrate the absurdity
of this ten-day-trial requirement. These statutes grant county attor-
neys significantly more time than ten days to charge defendants and
bring them to trial.77 The Nebraska Supreme Court has often stated
that "[ilt is a mark of statutory interpretation that in construing a
statute the . . .Court will presume that the Legislature intended a
73. Floor Debate on L.B. 991, 86th Leg., 2nd Sess. 9930 (Neb. 1980) (emphasis ad-
ded); Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the Nebraska Supreme Court at 8, Franco,
1999 WL 33640379 (Sept. 21, 1999) (No. 99-497) (available in the Schmid Law
Library at the University of Nebraska College of Law).
74. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-431 (Reissue 1979) (emphasis added); Petition For Writ of
Certiorari to the Nebraska Supreme Court at 8, 1999 WL 33640379 (Sept. 21,
1999) (No. 99-497) (available in the Schmid Law Library at the University of Ne-
braska College of Law).
75. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-431(4) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
76. Interview with Patrick Condon, Deputy Lancaster County Attorney, in Lincoln,
Neb. (Oct. 14, 2004).
77. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1995) (requiring the county attorneys to
bring a criminal defendant to trial within six months after being indicted); Id.
§ 29-110 (requiring county attorneys to charge a defendant for a crime within
three years of the incident for a felony and within eighteen months of the incident
for a misdemeanor).
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sensible rather than an absurd result."78 Following this principle of
statutory construction, the Franco court should have construed sec-
tion 28-431 to avoid the "absurd result" of assuming the legislature
intended to create a criminal forfeiture statute with an unworkable
procedure.
Evidence of how section 28-431 has fallen into disuse after Franco
also demonstrates that the statute's procedural mechanisms were not
meant to be applied to criminal forfeiture proceedings. According to
the Deputy Lancaster County Attorney who was responsible for bring-
ing forfeiture proceedings prior to Franco, section 28-431 practically
never is used anymore by any county attorney, and it is the policy of
Lancaster County not to bring a forfeiture action under the statute
when a conviction for narcotics possession is also being sought. 79 He
explained that this is because the procedural requirements of the stat-
ute as it was written make it almost entirely incompatible with the
Double Jeopardy requirement for multiple punishments to be brought
within the same proceeding.8 0
The Nebraska Supreme Court has observed that, "when a statute
is constitutionally suspect, we endeavor to interpret it in a manner
consistent with the Constitution."8 1 As this analysis of the Franco de-
cision has indicated, the Franco court had sufficient evidence to con-
strue section 28-431 in a way that avoided violating the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Rather than avoiding an unconstitutional interpre-
tation, however, it appears that the Franco court interpreted the stat-
ute so as to place it on a collision course with the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
B. Franco's Legacy: Federal Adoption
The Nebraska Supreme Court's holding in State v. Franco dramati-
cally altered the way forfeiture proceedings could be brought under
Nebraska law. By labeling section 28-431 as a criminal sanction and
requiring forfeitures under the statute and criminal charges to be
brought in a single, bifurcated proceeding, the Franco court effectively
wiped the statute off the books.82 As the story of Jacob King indicates,
however, the court's decision did not necessarily have the effect of
eliminating forfeiture proceedings within the state. Since State v.
Franco, Nebraska law enforcement has been relying exclusively upon
78. State v. Sinica, 220 Neb. 792, 798, 372 N.W.2d 445, 449 (1985) (citing Reed v.
McClow, 205 Neb. 739, 744, 290 N.W.2d 186, 189 (1980)).
79. Interview with Patrick Condon, supra note 76.
80. Id. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
81. Sinica, 220 Neb. at 798, 372 N.W.2d at 449.
82. Interview with Patrick Condon, supra note 76 (stating that forfeitures are rarely
brought under section 28-431 after State v. Franco and not at all in Lancaster
County when criminal narcotics charges are also being sought).
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a process known as "federal adoption" to seize suspected drug-related
assets.
Federal adoption (or "equitable sharing" as it is called in the fed-
eral regulations) was implemented during the 1984 amendments to
the federal forfeiture statutes with the stated purpose of encouraging
cooperation among federal and local law enforcement officials.
83 It is
essentially a process where local law enforcement agencies confiscate
drug-related assets and turn those assets over to the United States
Attorney.8 4 The United States Attorney then brings forfeiture pro-
ceedings under the federal forfeiture statute.8 5 After the United
States receives the forfeited property, eighty percent of the proceeds
are returned directly to the local law enforcement agency that made
the forfeiture, while the remaining twenty percent of the proceeds are
kept by the Department of Justice.
8 6
The most troubling aspect of the federal adoption system is that it
effectively allows local law enforcement officials to circumvent state
law.8 7 In Missouri, for example, the state constitution requires that
all proceeds received from drug-related forfeitures must be used solely
for the benefit of the state's public schools.88 Early in the 1990s, Mis-
souri's law enforcement willfully began to ignore this constitutional
requirement by turning over drug-related assets to the United States
Attorney.8 9 Since federal law requires that all proceeds returned
through federal adoption be given directly to the local law enforce-
ment agency that participated in the seizure of those funds, the state
law enforcement officials were able to violate the Missouri constitu-
tional requirement with impunity.9 0 In response, the Missouri State
Legislature amended its forfeiture statute in 1993 to require the order
of a state court judge before local law enforcement officials could turn
over assets for federal adoption.9 1
83. John Biewen, Asset Forfeiture (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=l1
4 2 4 5 9 ; see also U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Guide to Equitable Sharing of Federally Forfeited Property for
State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, in DOJ ASSET FORFEITURE MANUAL
8-9 (Mar. 1994), available at httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/criminal/publicdocs/ll-lprior/
crm06.pdf.
84. Karis Ann-Yu Chi, Comment, Follow the Money: Getting to the Root of the Prob-
lem with Civil Asset Forfeiture in California, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1635, 1662-64
(2002).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. David B. Smith, New Jersey's Statute Held Unconstitutional: Prosecutors May
Not Benefit from Forfeiture Cases, 27 CHAMPION 12, 13-14 (2003).
88. See Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 7.
89. See Smith, supra note 87, at 13-14.
90. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (2000).
91. See Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.647 (West 2002). The
Missouri statute states in relevant part:
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Although this statute helped rein in many of the abuses by Mis-
souri's local law enforcement, some law enforcement officials contin-
ued to circumvent the statute by utilizing tactics such as calling the
Federal Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") after discovering drug-re-
lated property and then having that agency make the arrest.9 2 As
Judge Loken stated in his concurring opinion in a case where this tac-
tic was used, "[by summoning a DEA agent and then pretending DEA
made the seizure, the DEA and Highway Patrol officers successfully
conspired to violate the Missouri Constitution, . . . the Missouri Re-
vised Code, and a Missouri Supreme Court decision."9 3 Judge Loken
also questioned whether the adoption provision was allowing federal
agencies to "us[e] their extensive forfeiture powers to frustrate the fis-
cal policy of states such as Missouri."94
Judge Loken's concerns about the inequity of the "equitable shar-
ing program" have been shared by numerous legal commentators.9 5
Since the start of the federal adoption program in 1984, other states
besides Missouri have taken issue with having their law enforcement
officials circumvent state laws that allocate proceeds from forfeitures
to programs such as public schools.96 As the legislatures of these
No state or local law enforcement agency may transfer any property
seized by the state or local agency to any federal agency for forfeiture
under federal law until the prosecuting attorney and the circuit judge of
the county in which the property was seized first review the seizure and
approve the transfer to a federal agency, regardless of the identity of the
seizing agency. The prosecuting attorney and the circuit judge shall not
approve any transfer unless it reasonably appears the activity giving
rise to the investigation or seizure involves more than one state or unless
it is reasonably likely to result in federal criminal charges being filed,
based upon a written statement of intent to prosecute from the United
States attorney with jurisdiction. No transfer shall be made to a federal
agency unless the violation would be a felony under Missouri law or fed-
eral law.
Id.
92. See Steffanie Stracke, Comment, The Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act: Replete
with Constitutional Violations, 57 Mo. L. REV. 909, 917 (1992); Martin Connolly,
Reardon Often Avoids Forfeiture Statutes, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 3, 1993, at A10;
Karen Dillon & Bob Lynn, KC Police Have Kept Money Due Schools, KAN. CITY
STAR, Oct. 19, 1996, at Al; Louis J. Rose & Tim Poor, Seizure After Loud Party
Took Man's Computer, Stereo, TV, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 3, 1991, at IA;
Virginia Young, Schools Hail Ruling on Drug Assets, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
November 28, 1990, at 1A.
93. In re U.S. Currency, $844,520.00, 136 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 1998) (Loken, J.,
concurring).
94. Id. at 582.
95. See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 44--46 (1998); Michael J. Duffy, A Drug
War Funded With Drug Money: The Federal Civil Forfeiture Statute and Federal-
ism, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 511, 535-40 (2001); Ann-Yu Chi, supra note 84, at
1645-49; Hadaway, supra note 9, at 92-96; Solomon, supra note 12, at 1173-80.
96. DAVID W. RASMUSSEN & BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ECONOMIC ANATOMY OF A DRUG
WAR: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE COMMONS 133-36 (1994) (explaining the attempt
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states started to recognize how the federal law was hindering their
ability to distribute forfeiture assets as they saw fit, these states lob-
bied Congress to amend the law.97 The states were initially success-
ful. Section 6077 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 amended the
federal adoption provisions to require the Attorney General to ensure
that assets transferred from local to federal law enforcement are "not
so transferred to circumvent any requirement of State law that pro-
hibits forfeiture or limits use or disposition of property forfeited to
State or local agencies."9 s This amendment was scheduled to go into
effect on October 1, 1989, and would have prohibited the use of federal
adoption practices that violated state law. Unfortunately, an inten-
sive lobby of both state and federal law enforcement officials was able
to convince Congress to repeal this amendment before its effective
date.99 The amendment's repeal was buried in the 1990 Defense Ap-
propriations Bill.100
As disconcerting as the repeal of this amendment was to the state
legislatures that lobbied for its passage, the reasoning given by law
enforcement representatives who lobbied for the amendment's repeal
was nothing short of shocking. Law enforcement representatives lob-
bying to repeal the amendment to the federal adoption procedure can-
didly admitted that the procedure was necessary in order to allow
them to circumvent their states' constitutional provisions.1O1 For in-
stance, Joseph W. Dean, the representative on behalf of the North
Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, offered this
explanation to the U.S. House Subcommittee on Crime:
The education lobby is the most powerful in the state [of North Carolina] and
has taken a position against law enforcement being able to share in seized
assets. The irony is that if local and state law enforcement agencies cannot
share, the assets will in all likelihood not be seized and forfeited.... If this
financial sharing stops, we will kill the goose that laid the golden egg.
1 0 2
As these remarks illustrate, the federal adoption statute has had the
collateral effect of turning state agencies against each other-all for
control of money. The situation described in Joseph Dean's testi-
mony-a state's own law enforcement going against a state law in or-
der to receive money allocated to the public schools-is exactly what
has been happening in Nebraska in the six years since Franco.
to amend the federal adoption provision by states whose laws allocated forfeiture
assets to other agencies).
97. Id.
98. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6077(a)(3)(B), 102 Stat.
4181, 4325 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)).
99. RASMUSSEN & BENSON, supra note 96, at 134.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 135.
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Besides giving local law enforcement the incentive and the means
to circumvent state law, federal adoption allows local law enforcement
to receive eighty percent of the proceeds they confiscate with minimal
requirements on how those proceeds are to be spent. While the adop-
tion program requires the proceeds received by law enforcement to be
used exclusively for law enforcement purposes, l0 3 the adoption stat-
ute provides little guidance on what law enforcement purposes are le-
gitimate.1 0 4 In fact, the Department of Justice guidelines on how
asset forfeitures can be used specifically allow law enforcement offi-
cials to spend adoption proceeds for such purposes as "payment of
overtime for officers and investigators; payment of the first year's sal-
aries for new law enforcement positions that supplement the
workforce; payment for temporary or not-to-exceed-one-year appoint-
ments; payments to informants; 'buy,' 'flash,' or reward money; and
the purchase of evidence."1O5
Allowing such broad discretion on how a local law enforcement
agency may spend potentially vast sums of money has led to some
rather incredulous results. A rather extreme example illustrates this
point. A small police station in the town of Little Compton, Rhode
Island, played a relatively minor role in breaking up an international
hashish ring in the early 1990s. After turning the proceeds over to the
federal government for forfeiture through the federal adoption pro-
gram, the department earned over $80 million from seized assets.
10 6
In order to spend the money for "law enforcement purposes," the small
department (consisting of seven officers and an annual budget of $1.8
million) purchased new squad cars outfitted with video cameras and
body-heat detection devices, constructed an indoor-outdoor firing
range, sent three officers to earn college degrees, installed a computer
telephone network, put police radios in school buses, and hired a local
to wash the police cars and wax the floor of the police station every
morning. 0 7 The department also rationalized such "law enforcement
expenditures" as buying new parking signs (a pubic-safety expense);
buying the city treasurer a new computer (for tracking the police de-
partment's sizeable assets); and purchasing fireworks for the town's
103. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON SEIZED AND FOR-
FEITED PROPERTY 7 (July 1990), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pub-
licdocs/11-lprior/crm05.pdf.
104. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 8-9. See also Solomon, supra note 12, at
1176-79 (arguing that the guidelines on how forfeiture proceeds are to be spent
by local law enforcement agencies are vague and lead to confusion over what law
enforcement purposes are truly legitimate).
105. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 10.
106. Steve Stecklow, Big Money for a Tiny Police Force, PHIL. INQ., Aug. 24, 1992, at
Al (available in the Schmid Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of
Law).
107. Id.
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Fourth of July celebration (to prevent the department from receiving
complaints from kids setting off fireworks of their own around
town).1 0 8 However, the Little Compton police chief drew the line
when the city requested to use the police department's funds to build a
new fire department.109
The story of Little Compton demonstrates another problem inher-
ent with federal adoption. As several legal commentators have sug-
gested, the incentives-created for local law enforcement to directly
benefit from asset forfeitures through federal adoption-almost inevi-
tably lead to a conflict between economic self-interest and traditional
law enforcement objectives.11o Such a conflict of interest taints the
image of the law enforcement agency and promotes overzealous law
enforcement practices, such as illegal searches,ll unnecessary uses of
force, 1 12 and racial profiling.113 As these commentators suggest, the
only meaningful reform to such a program would be to eliminate law
enforcement's direct economic incentive and ensure that forfeiture
proceeds are controlled by an independent agency and not placed di-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 3. Little Compton's struggle for control over how forfeiture funds could be
spent was eventually settled in state court. See Hayes v. Souther, 1992 WL
813638 (R.I. Super. 1992). The Rhode Island Superior Court concluded that a
Little Compton city ordinance allowed taxpayers to vote upon the City's proposed
plan for spending the forfeiture funds. Id. at *2. However, the court also con-
cluded that the ultimate decision for how the forfeiture funds would be used was
subject to approval by the United States Attorney. Id.
110. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 95, at 44-46; Duffy, supra note 95, at
535-40; Ann-Yu Chi, supra note 84, at 1645-49; Hadaway, supra note 9, at
92-96; Solomon, supra note 12, at 1173-80. See also Biewen, supra note 83 (re-
porting on how creating an economic incentive to seek forfeitures affects law en-
forcement practices).
111. Mark J. Crandley, A Plymouth, a Parolee, and the Police: The Case for the Exclu-
sionary Rule in Civil Forfeiture After Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
v. Scott, 65 ALB. L. REV. 147, 160-65 (2001) (arguing that the economic incentive
behind forfeitures leads to illegal searches from law enforcement in an effort to
seize property).
112. See Duffy, supra note 95, at 511 (introducing the story of Donald Scott, who was
killed in a law enforcement raid of his 200-acre property, initiated with the pur-
pose of finding marijuana plants that would allow the property to be forfeited).
113. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops
and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1420-22 (2000)
(arguing that the economic incentive to confiscate drug money leads to a dispro-
portionate seizure of assets from minorities on the assumption that minorities
with large amounts of money must be drug dealers); Biewen, supra note 83. Ja-
cob King's own story provides further evidence of how, even in Nebraska, racial
profiling and asset forfeitures go hand-in-hand. See supra notes 1, 2 and accom-
panying text. See also Butch Mabin, Patrol Acknowledges Race Profiling, LIN-
COLN J. STAR, Aug. 27, 2004, at 1A (documenting the Nebraska State Patrol's
internal investigations into racial profiling).
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rectly into the hands of the agents responsible for enforcing the very
laws from which they are profiting.ii
4
In Nebraska, forfeitures pursuant to federal adoption have in-
creased dramatically since the Franco court effectively nullified Ne-
braska's forfeiture statute.'1 5 In Lancaster County, for example,
nearly all drug-related assets seized by local law enforcement are
turned over to the federal authorities."i 6 With eighty percent of the
forfeiture proceeds going directly to the law enforcement agencies, as
opposed to only fifty percent under the state system, it is no surprise
that Nebraska's law enforcement did not lobby the state legislature to
amend section 28-431 after the Franco decision.ii 7 Whatever the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's intent was when it decided Franco, the ulti-
mate effect was to replace a forfeiture system that had significant
procedural safeguards for property owners, while benefiting both the
public schools and local law enforcement, with a system that offered
few procedural protections and allowed no state control over assets
114. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 95, at 110-12; Hadaway, supra note 9, at 105.
See also Biewen, supra note 83 (discussing the option of placing forfeiture assets
in a state's general fund instead of allowing it to go to the seizing law enforce-
ment agency).
115. In the year after the Franco decision, for example, forfeiture proceeds adopted by
the state under the federal system nearly tripled. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM, ANN. REP. (1999) (reporting equitable sharing
payments for Nebraska at $1,025,731), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/
afp/02fundreport/FY1999AFPLinks.htm, with U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSET FOR-
FEITURE PROGRAM, ANN. REP. (2000) (reporting equitable sharing payments for
Nebraska at $2,889,867), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/afp/02fundre-
portfFY2000AFPLinks.htm.
116. Interview with Patrick Condon, supra note 76. The only exception to this general
policy is when property owners were being prosecuted for drug charges under
federal law. In these rare cases, Lancaster County Attorneys were still able to
utilize section 28-431, because a criminal conviction was not being sought under
state law. Id.
117. The division of these forfeiture proceeds among local law enforcement agencies
demonstrates another flaw in the federal adoption program. The Nebraska State
Patrol typically receives the lion's share of forfeiture proceeds, since it is the
agency that confiscates the majority of drug-related assets. In 2004, for example,
of the $3,337,864 that was distributed through the federal adoption program,
over half of the proceeds ($1,852,220) were distributed directly to the State Pa-
trol. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM, ANN. REP. (2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/afp/O2fundreport/2004affr/states/nebras
ka.htm. The problem with this distribution scheme is that the State Patrol is
specifically funded for its drug law enforcement by the Nebraska State Legisla-
ture, and funds that it receives through federal adoption are being taken away
from smaller county law enforcement agencies. It was for this reason that the
State Patrol was specifically excluded under Nebraska's forfeiture statute when
it was first enacted. See Hearing on L.B. 247, supra note 35 (statement of Sena-
tor Carol McBride-Pirsch, co-sponsor of LB 247) (explaining the purpose of ex-
cluding the State Patrol from receiving forfeiture proceeds under the proposed
state forfeiture law).
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that were confiscated by the state's own law enforcement.l1s Under
such a system, Nebraska's law enforcement may win, but everyone
else loses.119
C. A Proposal for Reform
In 1984, the citizens of Nebraska voted to approve the state consti-
tutional amendment that would allow forfeiture proceeds to be divided
equally between the state's law enforcement and the state's
schools.120 Today, that command has been cast aside, not only be-
cause of the Franco decision, but also by the subsequent inaction of
the state's legislature. As a result of this inaction, Nebraska's schools
have lost badly needed funds to which they are entitled under the Ne-
braska Constitution.12 1 Countless property owners such as Jacob
King have been thrown into a forfeiture system that lacks the proce-
dural safeguards the Nebraska Legislature intended property owners
in this state to have. Finally, Nebraska's own law enforcement agen-
cies have been harmed through the inequitable distribution of forfei-
ture assets under federal adoption.122 Fortunately, the legislative
body that created many of these problems also has the power to cor-
rect them, simply by amending Nebraska's forfeiture statute.
118. The federal civil forfeiture procedures were amended extensively by Congress in
2000 in response to widespread criticism. The burden of proof on the government
was raised from probable cause to a preponderance of the evidence, an innocent
owner's defense was provided for in all forfeiture statutes, and indigent criminal
defendants may be allowed representation of counsel in concurrent forfeiture pro-
ceedings. See Hadaway, supra note 9, at 102-05. However, even with these im-
provements, the statutes still fail to address the issue critical to many legal
commentators: direct control of law enforcement over forfeiture proceeds. See id.
at 105; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 95, at 40-56; Duffy€, supra note
95, at 535-45; Ann-Yu Chi, supra note 84, at 145-55. Nebraska's county drug
law enforcement boards were able to provide that critical buffer between law en-
forcement, and the money they confiscated.
119. Again, it is important to note that certain law enforcement agencies benefit far
more than others under the federal adoption program. See supra note 117. The
intent of the Nebraska forfeiture statute was to encourage cooperation and asset
distribution among county law enforcement agencies through the County drug
enforcement boards. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439.03 (Reissue 1995). Under
the federal system, however, the law enforcement agency that turns funds over
for federal adoption has the exclusive right to utilize those proceeds for its own
"law enforcement purposes." See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 7.
120. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
121. One only has to pick up a local newspaper to read about how Nebraska's schools
have been affected by budget cuts. See, e.g., Scott Bauer, Small Schools Fight
Latest Consolidation Efforts, LINCOLN J. STAR, Feb. 12, 2005, at 1A; Nate Jen-
kins, School Bill Advances on Deal-Making, LINCOLN J. STAR, Feb. 16, 2005, at
1A; Barbara Nordby, Supreme Court Hears School Aid Case, LINCOLN J. STAR,
Feb. 1, 2005, at 1A; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center, Discussing Lin-
coln's Future: Schools and Growth, LINCOLN J. STAR, Feb. 6, 2005, at 1A.
122. See supra notes 117, 119.
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1. Superseding Franco
In order to address many of the concerns outlined in this Note, sec-
tion 28-431 would have to be amended in several ways. The easiest
task would be for the Nebraska Legislature to supersede State v.
Franco by expressing the clear legislative intent that forfeitures
brought under section 28-431 are civil, in rem proceedings, and that
such proceedings are meant largely to emulate forfeiture proceedings
under federal law. Several states have expressed this clear legislative
intent by prefacing their forfeiture statutes with a declaration of the
intent to create a civil forfeiture procedure.12 3 Amending section 28-
431 to include such a declaration would be sufficient to overcome the
first prong of the two-prong test utilized by the Nebraska Supreme
Court in Franco. Additionally, since the Nebraska Supreme Court has
indicated that Nebraska's Double Jeopardy Clause offers concurrent
protections with the federal Double Jeopardy Clause,12 4 the U.S. Su-
preme Court's holding in Ursery should foreclose a finding by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court that section 28-431 is "so punitive in form and
effect as to render [the statute] criminal despite [the legislature's] in-
tent to the contrary."
125
2. Limiting Federal Adoption
The Nebraska Legislature also has the power to limit the practice
of federal adoption by adding a provision to section 28-431 that grants
the state courts in rem jurisdiction over all property seized by state
law enforcement officers. 12 6 Other states have drafted their forfeiture
123. The clearest example of expressed legislative intent comes from the Illinois forfei-
ture statute, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 § 2 (West 1993).
124. State v. Franco, 257 Neb. 15, 20, 594 N.W.2d 633, 637-38 (1999).
125. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996). See also Adam C. Wells, Com-
ment, Multiple-Punishment & the Double Jeopardy Clause: The United States v.
Ursery Decision, 71 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 153, 170 (1997) (indicating that, under the
two-prong test used in Ursery, "the clearest proof" is required to second guess
legislative intent, and that intent will typically prevail except in the most egre-
giously punitive circumstances). Contra State v. Nunez, 2 P.3d 264, 272-73
(N.M. 1999) (rejecting Ursery's two-prong test on the ground that the state's
Double Jeopardy Clause provided greater protection than the federal clause).
126. See, e.g., Scarabin v. DEA, 966 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the DEA
lacked in rem jurisdiction over the property, even though it had physical control
over money seized by the sheriffs department, because under Louisiana law, the
state district court had exclusive control over the property by virtue of issuing the
search warrant); United States v. $490,020 in United States Currency, 911 F.
Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that under New York forfeiture statutes, the
issuing of search warrants provides the state with in rem jurisdiction, and bars
U.S. Attorney from instituting forfeiture proceedings without a turnover order
from state court). Contra State v. Wetherbee, 86 A.2d 527 (Vt. 2004) (holding
that where the state does not have a statutory scheme granting the state courts
in rem jurisdiction, federal law enforcement may subsequently seize property and
institute federal forfeiture actions).
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statutes in this way to give their courts exclusive jurisdiction over the
property seized by their own law enforcement agencies. 12 7 The effec-
tiveness of these statutes is based upon the basic jurisdictional princi-
ple announced by the Supreme Court in Penn General Casualty Co. v.
Pennsylvania128 that "the court first assuming jurisdiction over the
property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the other."12 9 By declaring state court jurisdiction over property
seized by local law enforcement, the Nebraska Legislature could then
limit the turnover of assets under the equitable sharing program to
those situations where seizures truly are made as a result of joint op-
erations between state and federal law enforcement, instead of contin-
uing to turn over assets to the federal government in those situations
where seizures are made by the sole efforts of local law
enforcement. 13
0
The stated purpose of the equitable sharing program is to "enhance
cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement," 13 1 but
allowing the adoption of forfeitures made solely by local law enforce-
ment officials is inapposite to such a purpose. The only cooperation
that occurs between local and federal law enforcement in these situa-
tions is the cooperation to circumvent state law. 13 2 By limiting the
turnover of forfeiture assets to legitimate situations where federal and
127. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(d) (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1536
(West 2000); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/9(J) (West 2002) (discussing concurrent
jurisdiction between state courts and state attorney); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 167 (West 1993); MASS. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 276, § 3 (West 2005); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. §§ 690.05-.55 (McKinney 1995).
128. 294 U.S. 189 (1935).
129. Id. at 195. The stated purpose for this jurisdictional rule is to "[t]o avoid un-
seemly and disastrous conflicts in the administration of our dual judicial system,
and to protect the judicial processes of the court first assuming jurisdiction." Id.
See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960) ("The very essence of a
healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state
and federal courts.").
130. These restrictions are referred to as "turnover orders." Missouri and Utah, for
example, have created these turnover order rules in order to require local law
enforcement to seek approval from a state court before the court will release
seized property from its jurisdiction. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 513.647 (West 2002);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 24-1-15 (West 2004). Under these turnover order rules, a
state court is typically only permitted to authorize transfers if it finds that the
activity giving rise to the seizure (1) is a felony under state or federal law and (2)
either involves more than one state or is reasonably likely to result in a federal
criminal prosecution. See Mo. STAT. ANN. § 513.647; UTAH CODE ANN. § 24-1-15.
If the state court does not release jurisdiction over the seized property, a forfei-
ture could only be brought under state law.
131. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 1.
132. Ann-Yu Chi, supra note 84, at 1645-50. Encouraging cooperation between state
and federal law enforcement can also be accomplished in broader contexts than
asset sharing, such as through the establishment of state-controlled drug-en-
forcement boards. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. 961.11, .54 (West 1998).
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state authorities are working together, the legislature could ensure
that the policy behind the equitable sharing program is not being frus-
trated, while at the same time adhere to the will of the state's citizens
who demonstrated their desire to have forfeited assets shared equally
between law enforcement and the public schools.
Limiting the use of federal adoption in this way also would not sig-
nificantly reduce the law enforcement budget. Federal adoption still
would be available in situations where state and federal authorities
are truly engaged in joint narcotics operations. Additionally, under
the state forfeiture system, one hundred percent of forfeited assets
would stay in the State of Nebraska, whereas federal adoption allows
the federal government to retain twenty percent of forfeited assets,
often without expending significant effort. 133 Although the state sys-
tem would allow law enforcement to receive only fifty percent of for-
feited proceeds, the net benefit would be an increased amount of funds
available to Nebraska.134
Another important benefit of limiting federal adoption in Nebraska
is that this would require law enforcement to utilize the provision of
the state forfeiture scheme that allocates fifty percent of seized assets
to the county drug law enforcement boards. 13 5 These agencies were
specifically created to allow local control of forfeiture proceeds by offi-
cials who would be able to regulate law enforcement expenditures of
forfeiture funds.136 Such a system would alleviate the predominant
criticism of legal commentators-that law enforcement officials who
have direct control over forfeiture proceeds are likely to have a conflict
of interest and engage in overzealous law enforcement in order to in-
crease their own budgets. 13 7 At the same time, reinstating the county
drug boards would lead to more transparency on exactly how forfei-
ture assets are being spent by local law enforcement agencies in the
state. 138 The county drug boards could also encourage unity of effort
among the county law enforcement agencies and ensure that forfei-
ture funds are being shared by the county law enforcement agencies
as needed, instead of going solely to the agency that made the
seizure. 139
133. See Ann-Yu Chi, supra note 84, at 1645-49.
134. Of course, the most effective way to limit federal adoption and protect the states
from having their own law enforcement circumvent state law would be to lobby
Congress to amend the federal adoption procedures as it had done once before.
See RASMUSSEN & BENSON, supra note 96, at 133-36; supra notes 95-99 and ac-
companying text. However, as recent history demonstrates, the power of the law
enforcement lobby would likely prevent such an amendment from passing at this
time. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
135. See NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439.03 (Reissue 1995).
136. See supra note 35.
137. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
138. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439.03.
139. See id. § 28-1439.05.
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3. Additional Procedural Protections
To continue offering the citizens of Nebraska greater protections
than are allotted under federal law, section 28-431 could also be
amended to update the statute with whatever additional procedural
protections the legislature sees fit to include. The federal forfeiture
statute, for example, was recently amended to include a provision that
allows indigent defendants who are subject to both criminal proceed-
ings and concurrent civil forfeiture proceedings to utilize an appointed
public defender for both actions.140 The amendment also grants
claimants the opportunity to petition the court for a temporary release
of the property pending the final disposition of the forfeiture proceed-
ings in situations where the property owner can demonstrate extreme
hardship.141
Amending section 28-431 to offer increased procedural protections
such as these would not greatly increase the costs of bringing forfei-
ture proceedings. Granting these protections would also ensure that
Nebraska's forfeiture system would continue to offer property owners
in this state at least as many protections as are offered in the federal
system.
IV. CONCLUSION
For better or worse, civil forfeiture proceedings are here to stay in
Nebraska. The choice now for the legislature is to decide who will ini-
tiate those forfeiture proceedings and what protections will be pro-
vided to the citizens of this state. 14 2 Used properly, forfeitures can be
a powerful weapon in the war on drugs, as well as a benefit to the
citizen-taxpayers. Since State v. Franco, however, civil forfeiture in
Nebraska has become a practice of "passing the buck," where innocent
property owners, such as Jacob King, are swept up in a system that
encourages overzealous law enforcement and that has no accountabil-
140. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983); Hadaway, supra note 9, at 102-05.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 983(f) (2000); Hadaway, supra note 9, at 109-10.
142. In a recent attempt to amend Nebraska's forfeiture statute, Nebraska State Sen-
ator Kermit Brashear proposed a bill that would have enacted many of the re-
forms advocated in this Note. See L.B. 538, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005).
In its original form, this bill not only would have clarified Nebraska's forfeiture
statute to express the clear legislative intent that it create civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings, but it also would have added additional procedural protections for prop-
erty owners. See id. These protections included granting indigent property
owners the right to proceed in forma pauperis when contesting the forfeiture and
allowing them the right to appointment of counsel. Id. Additionally, this pro-
posed bill would have earmarked a significant portion of forfeiture proceeds for
use in funding drug abuse treatment programs. Id. Unfortunately, all of these
revisions to Nebraska's forfeiture law were stripped from the bill when it was
amended in the Judiciary Committee. See id. (as amended by AM 1650).
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ity to either the state legislature or to the citizens of Nebraska. It is
time for the Nebraska Legislature to amend the state's forfeiture stat-
ute to protect the expressed intent of the state's citizens who com-
manded that forfeiture proceeds be divided equally between local law
enforcement and the public schools. Only by refining its own forfei-
ture system can Nebraska ensure that the system will protect the
rights of its citizens and reflect the values shared by the citizens of
this state. It is time for Nebraska to stop passing the buck.
Jason R. Humke
